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The Governor's Commissions Recommendations on
Groundwater: Treading Water Until the Next Drought
Kevin M. O'Brien*
"And it never failed that during the dry years the people forgot about the
rich years, and during the wet years they lost all memory of the dry
years. It was always that way. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
As once stated, the "essential ingredient of politics is timing,",2 and the timing of
the issuance of the Final Report of the Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law ("Commission") could not have been worse from a political
standpoint. The severe drought of 1976-1977 had ended, and dry conditions would
not return to California until the 1987-1992 drought.' Not coincidentally, the
principal legislative recommendations of the Commission regarding groundwater
received little -attention from the Legislature until 1992.4 Furthermore, the
groundwater statutes that eventually emerged from the legislative process bore little
resemblance to the Commission's recommendations.
Why did the Commission achieve so little in the field of groundwater? The
answer lies in part with the Commission's recommendations. For example, the
Commission proposed groundwater management legislation that was ostensibly
based on the principle of local primacy over groundwater management,5 but that
gave the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") a prominent role in
the development and oversight of local groundwater management programs. The
groundwater management legislation that eventually emerged from the
Legislature, 1992's Assembly Bill 3030,6 rejected the Commission's proposal for
SWRCB involvement in groundwater management.
The legislative proposal for adjudication of water rights provides another
example of a Commission recommendation that missed the mark.7 With little
fanfare, the Commission proposed a rather radical change in the conceptualization of
* Partner, Downey Brand LLP, Sacramento, California; J.D., University of Denver (1980); A.B.,
University of California, Davis (1977). The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Robia Chang in
the research and preparation of this article.
1. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 6 (Penguin Books 2002) (1952).
2. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Creative Quotations from Pierre Elliot Trudeau, at http://creativequotations.
com/one/2555.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2004) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
3. DEP'T OF WATER RES., CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER UPDATE 2003, at 24 (Bulletin 118) [hereinafter
DWR BULLETIN 118].
4. See infra notes 6, 32-34 and accompanying text.
5. See GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 171
(Dec. 1978) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
6. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 947 (enacting the Groundwater Management Act codified at CAL. WATER CODE
§§ 10750-10755.4 (West Supp. 2004)).
7. See infra Part ll.D.
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groundwater rights, recommending that "the basis of future groundwater adjudications
is fair and equitable apportionment of rights to extract groundwater, with considerable
discretion to be left in the court to avoid races-to-the-pumphouse and other problems."
8
In hindsight, the Commission's failure to discuss the implications, from a property
rights standpoint, of its "equitable apportionment" proposal is difficult to comprehend.
Notably, a unanimous California Supreme Court rejected the theory of "equitable
apportionment" in the adjudication of groundwater rights in City of Barstow v. Mojave
Water Agency.9
The Commission's recommendations on groundwater are also noteworthy for
what they failed to address. Many of the current "hot" topics in groundwater-
the scope of county authority to regulate groundwater; appropriate hydrogeologic
criteria for distinguishing percolating groundwater from subterranean stream
flow; unanswered questions in the law of groundwater rights; rules governing
water transfers based on groundwater substitution-received scant attention from
the Commission. In many instances, of course, these topics had not risen to the
surface of water policy debate in California at the time of the Commission's
deliberations. It is nonetheless surprising (at least to this practitioner) that the
Commission did not anticipate the emergence of some of these issues or attempt
to influence their development.
Perhaps it was a mistake to include the vast topic of groundwater within the
Commission's charter in the first instance. Historically in California, rightly or
wrongly, the administration of rights to groundwater and surface water has been
treated separately. Whereas the law of surface water rights is largely codified and
administered at the state level, the law of groundwater rights is essentially based
on common law principles and the administration and management of
groundwater is left to local authorities or the courts. In addition, while much is
known scientifically about the functioning of surface water systems, especially
the complexities of the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, relatively little is known
about the hydrogeology of certain important groundwater systems.10 In many
respects, the vast subject of groundwater warrants the establishment of its own
Governor's Commission, focused on the development of solutions to the thorny
problems that continue to emerge in relation to this critical resource.
8. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 169.
9. 5 P.3d 853, 864-69 (Cal. 2000).
10. The most significant example of this lack of knowledge is the vast Sacramento Valley where the
nature and extent of the hydrologic interconnection between the Sacramento River and its tributaries, on the one
hand, and local groundwater basins, on the other, is now receiving its first comprehensive study. The study is in
connection with the implementation of the Sacramento Valley Water Management Agreement, which pertains
to the legal responsibility, if any, of Sacramento Valley water users to forego water diversions to assist in the
attainment of water quality objectives in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. See DWR BULLETIN 118, supra
note 3, at 69.
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II. THE COMMISSION'S SUCCESSES AND FAILURES
The central premise underlying the Commission's work on groundwater was
stated succinctly: "California's extensive and extremely valuable groundwater
resources are not adequately protected."" As discussed in detail elsewhere in this
symposium, 12 the Commission recommended legislation in four subject areas:
groundwater resources management;13 groundwater management districts;1
4
conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water;' 5 and groundwater rights
adjudication. 16 The following discussion examines the Commission's successes
and failures in these areas.
A. Groundwater Resources Management
The Commission based its recommendations concerning groundwater
management on the view that "local groundwater management entities ... have
primary responsibility for the protection and management" of the State's
groundwater resources. 17 But the legislation proposed by the Commission made
clear that two state agencies-the SWRCB and the Department of Water
Resources ("DWR")-would play a prominent role in the development and
implementation of local groundwater management programs. In the author's
view, the designation of the SWRCB as the agency with primary responsibility
for oversight of local groundwater management significantly contributed to the
failure of the Commission's proposal to gain traction during the subsequent
legislative process. The SWRCB is principally a regulatory agency, charged by
statute with the responsibility of overseeing water quality and the administration
of water rights in relation to surface water; it has neither the expertise nor the
institutional capability to serve as a resource management agency.
The Commission's proposed legislation provided that the report to the
Governor and the Legislature be submitted by the DWR pursuant to Water Code
section 12924,'8 which required identification of groundwater basin boundaries
throughout the State, and would establish groundwater management area
boundaries for all purposes unless disapproved by a concurrent resolution of the
Legislature within one-hundred legislative days.19 It further empowered the
11. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 136.
12. See generally Karen D. Bettencourt, Below the Surface: An Introduction to the Governor's Commission's
Recommendations on the Management of Groundwater Resources, 36 MCGEORGE L. REv. 405 (2005).
13. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 170-93.
14. See id. at 194-230.
15. See id. at 231-36.
16. See id. at 237-50.
17. Id. at 171.
18. CAL. WATER CODE § 12924 (West 1992).
19. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 179. Under the proposed legislation, the SWRCB was granted
authority to recommend and establish groundwater management area boundaries for areas encompassing basins
identified by the DWR whose establishment as groundwater management areas was disapproved by the
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Legislature, by statute, to modify boundaries identified by the DWR.2° Under the
proposed legislation, groundwater management areas were to "encompass all
areas of the State with significant groundwater resources. ' 21 However, the
SWRCB would be given authority to "classify as inactive" those areas that would
"not be subject at that time to groundwater management authority designation
and program requirements. 22
Following the establishment of groundwater management areas, local entities
within the area would be provided an opportunity "to identify a responsible
[agency] to carry out the groundwater management program" and send its
nomination to the SWRCB.23 In addition, local entities with jurisdiction over all,
or substantially all, of the area could "petition the [SWRCB] to designate the
local entity as the groundwater management authority for the area., 24 If local
entities failed to step forward, then the SWRCB would be required to "designate
one such local entity as the groundwater management authority for the area" and
"submit its designation ... to the Legislature. 25 The designation would become
effective unless disapproved by the Legislature within a specified time period. 6
If the SWRCB determined that no local entity covered all, or substantially all, of
the groundwater management area, and "no joint powers authority [was]
organized for the area .... then a groundwater management district.. [would] be
formed in the area, and. . . designated [the] groundwater management authority
for the area.,
27
With respect to the content of groundwater management programs, the
proposed legislation provided that the groundwater management authority would
28adopt a groundwater management program. Again, the SWRCB received a
prominent role-to evaluate each program and determine whether the
groundwater management objectives stated in the program conform to specified
legislative policies and "whether the implementation plan [would] be adequate to
achieve the groundwater management objectives stated in the program."29 If no
local authority transmitted a groundwater management program to the SWRCB
for an area, or if a program was considered inadequate, the SWRCB was
authorized to request that the Attorney General seek judicial relief.30 Once
requested to do so, the Attorney General could file in the superior court an action
Legislature. Such recommended boundaries would become the designated boundaries for all purposes unless
disapproved by the Legislature. Id. at 180.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 179.
22. Id. at 181.
23. Id. at 183-84.
24. Id. at 185.
25. Id. at 185-86.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 187.
28. Id. at 188.
29. Id. at 190.
30. Id.
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for: (1) an adjudication of rights to groundwater in the area; (2) "imposition of an
appropriate groundwater management program, and for issuance of a preliminary
injunction against increased extraction in the groundwater management area until
a program is prepared; or (3) other appropriate relief.",3
It took more than a dozen years following issuance of the Commission's
Final Report for the Legislature to adopt generally-applicable groundwater
management legislation. The statutory scheme that eventually emerged-1992's
Assembly Bill 3030 32-bears little resemblance to the legislation proposed by the
Commission. While the Legislature retained the principle of local primacy
advanced by the Commission, it rejected the mandatory elements of the
Commission's proposal in favor of a program that is, in effect, voluntary.3 3 More
significantly, the Legislature gave the SWRCB no authority to review or approve
groundwater management programs and essentially eliminated the DWR's role in
plan development.34
Did the Commission have the better approach to groundwater management?
The DWR recently observed:
How successful groundwater management has been throughout the State is a
difficult question and cannot be answered at present. While there are many
examples of local agency successes .... there are neither mandates to prepare
groundwater management plans nor reporting requirements when plans are
implemented, so a comprehensive assessment of local planning efforts is not
possible. Additionally, many plans have been adopted only recently, during a
period of several consecutive wet years, so many of the plan components are
either untested or not implemented.35
Given the lack of comprehensive state legislation addressing the ad-
ministration of private rights to groundwater in California,36 it is imperative that
local mechanisms for groundwater management be fostered and developed. But
the "command and control" model proposed by the Commission, in which the
31. Id.atl90-91.
32. 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 947 (enacting the Groundwater Management Act codified at CAL. WATER CODE
§§10750-10755.4 (West Supp. 2004)).
33. In 2002, new legislation, Senate Bill 1938, modified Assembly Bill 3030. 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 603
(codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10753.1, 10753.4, 10753.7-10753.10, 10795.4). Among other things, Senate
Bill 1938 imposed new standards for groundwater management plans and provided that a local agency that
completes an upgrade of its plan to meet the requirements of the new legislation within one year of applying for
state funds for certain groundwater projects shall be given "priority consideration" for state funds administered
by the DWR over local agencies that are in the process of developing a groundwater management plan. Id. (as
codified in CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7(b)(1)(A)).
34. Senate Bill 1938 requires that all local agencies that adopt a groundwater management plan pursuant
to Senate Bill 1938 submit a copy of the plan to the DWR, and that the DWR make copies of these plans
available to the public. 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 603.
35. DWR BuLLETIN 118, supra note 3, at 44 (citation omitted).
36. Gregory S. Weber, Forging a More Coherent Groundwater Policy in California: State and Federal
Constitutional Challenges to Local Groundwater Export Restrictions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373, 377
(1994).
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SWRCB would assume the role of chief overseer of local groundwater
management efforts, would, in the author's view, likely trigger a political
backlash that would ultimately retard the development of effective groundwater
management programs at the local level. The current incremental approach, while
at times frustratingly slow in its progress, is more likely to achieve positive long-
term results.
A key issue in the development of local groundwater management programs
is funding. In recent years, agricultural water districts in California have been
forced to accept a variety of new fees and assessments which, in the aggregate,
have exacerbated the problem of lack of funding for local groundwater
management programs. 37 Recent legislation has established funding mechanisms
for the development and expansion of local groundwater management programs
38
and it appears that local agencies throughout the State are becoming more aware
of the need to upgrade their management efforts. The legislation also requires
that groundwater management plans include specific components to establish
agency eligibility for public funds for groundwater projects.39 It remains to be
seen whether the "carrot" approach to groundwater management advanced by the
Legislature achieves sufficient results to avoid the "stick" approach proposed by
the Commission.
B. Groundwater Management Districts
As a companion to its legislative proposals for groundwater resources
management, the Commission proposed enabling legislation for the formation of
groundwater management districts.4° In the absence of an existing groundwater
management authority for an area, the Commission proposed to require the
establishment of groundwater management districts, which would develop and
implement groundwater management programs for the area.4'
The proposed legislation drew heavily from the provisions of existing water
district laws with respect to organizational structure and procedural requirements.
But the Commission also included several new provisions to aid in the develop-ment
of effective groundwater management programs. First, the legislation provided that
groundwater management districts may require extraction facilities situated within
the groundwater management area to register with the groundwater management
district, and to provide bi-annual statements setting forth the total amount of water
37. One example, applicable to districts that contract for water through the Central Valley Project, is the
restoration fund payments required under section 3407 of the Central Valley Project Improvement Act
("CVPIA"), Pub. L. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
38. A.B. 303, 2000 Cal. Stat. ch. 708, sec. 2 (enacting the Local Groundwater Management Assistance
Act of 2000 codified at CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10795-10795.20 (West 2004)).
39. S.B. 1938, 2002 Cal. Stat. ch. 603 (as codified in CAL. WATER CODE § 10753.7).
40. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 194-230.
41. Id. at 197.
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extracted during the preceding six-month period.42 Second, it gave the groundwater
management district "authority to control groundwater storage rights within the
groundwater management area, and to enter into groundwater storage agreements."
43
Third, it authorized the imposition of groundwater extraction charges and "basin
equity assessments" on all groundwater extraction facilities within the groundwater
management area, except the extraction of water stored pursuant to a groundwater
storage agreement or other storage commenced before the designation of the
groundwater management authority for the area.an
The Commission's proposed groundwater management district legislation
was never adopted. The enactment of Assembly Bill 3030 in 1992 provided an
alternative mechanism for developing groundwater management plans by
existing local agencies. In those areas where existing local agencies either did not
exist or declined to promulgate groundwater management plans, the Legislature
has selectively enacted special legislation authorizing the formation of local
groundwater management entities.45 Special legislation has been shown to be an
effective mechanism for establishing local groundwater management efforts,
particularly in areas that have specific groundwater problems such as seawater
intrusion or overdraft.46
C. Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water
The Commission proposed legislation to promote greater conjunctive use of
groundwater and surface water by clarifying: (1) the nature and extent of rights to
use groundwater basin storage space; 47 (2) the role of groundwater storage
agreements; 48 (3) the rules governing extraction of stored water;49 and, (4) the
relative priority for use of a groundwater basin for purposes of replenishing and
managing local groundwater supplies versus use of the basin for storage of
water. 5° The Commission's conjunctive use proposals met with very little success
in the Legislature.
42. ld. at 211,213.
43. Id. at 216.
44. Id. at 216-17, 220-24.
45. CAL. WATER CODE app. chs. 40, 60, 100, 118, 119, 121, 124, 128, 129, 131, 135 (West 1995 &
Supp. 2004); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10700-10717 (West Supp. 2004).
46. One example is the Salinas Valley, where seawater intrusion has been a problem for more than fifty
years. Following many years of local effort, the Monterey County Water Resources Agency, a district
established pursuant to special legislation, CAL. WATER CODE app. ch. 52, § 4 (West 1999), recently approved
the Salinas Valley Water Project, which is designed to halt seawater intrusion and provide for water supply
needs in the Salinas Valley over the next several decades.
47. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 231-33.
48. Id. at 233-35.
49. Id. at 235.
50. Id. at 236.
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1. Underground Storage Rights and Storage Agreements
The Commission proposed that the groundwater management authority for
each groundwater management area be given the authority; first, "to control all
groundwater storage rights within the groundwater management area" and,
second, "to determine the amount of groundwater basin storage space available
and to allocate groundwater basin storage space within the area."5' The
Commission also proposed legislation requiring that all groundwater basin
storage by a person, who is not the area's groundwater management authority, be
done through a groundwater storage agreement between that person and the
groundwater management authority.52 Finally, the legislation provided that:
the groundwater management authority shall give priority to the reasonable
water supply needs of the area overlying the basin and the area historically
supplied by the basin's water supply and to replenishment of the basin
pursuant to a management program. Any remaining basin storage space
shall be available for the use and benefit of other users outside of the
groundwater management area.
None of these proposals became law.
Was the Commission correct in attempting to clarify the law on ownership of
underground storage space? In the author's view, given the rather confusing and
unsettled state of California law in this area,54 and the need for clear rules
defining ownership rights if conjunctive use programs are to proliferate, the
Commission was correct in attempting to address this issue. The following
discussion briefly highlights the key unresolved issues.
Many western states provide, by statute or case law, that the owner of land in
fee has the right to the surface and everything situated beneath it.55 On its face,
this rule of law would seem to provide landowners with a strong claim to
compensation for public use of the storage space underlying their property. But
the cases decided to date have tended to limit the liability of public recharge
project operators, at least in situations where the private landowner cannot
51. Id. at 231.
52. Id. at 233.
53. Id.
54. For general commentary on this topic, see, e.g., Victor E. Gleason, Water Projects Go Underground,
5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 625 (1976); Norman W. Thorson, Storing Water Underground: What's the Aqui-Fer? 57 NEB.
L. REV. 581 (1978); see also William A. Hillhouse Il, Integrating Ground and Surface Water Use in an
Appropriation State, 20 ROCKY MTN. MiN. L. INST. 691 (1975); Susan M. Trager, Emerging Forums for
Groundwater Dispute Resolution in California: A Glimpse at the Second Generation of Groundwater Issues
and How Agencies Work Towards Problem Resolution, 20 PAC. L.J. 31 (1988).
55. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 829 (West 1982) ("The owner of land in fee has the right to the surface and
to everything permanently situated beneath or above it."); 5 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY
64A.01 [6] (2004) (landowner has cause of action in trespass for intrusion into subsurface of land).
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demonstrate that the public use has interfered with a valid private use of the
subsurface.
The most frequently-discussed case addressing the rights of a private
landowner vis-A-vis the rights of a public entity engaged in artificial recharge is
Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water District,56 decided prior to
issuance of the Commission's Final Report. Niles has been cited by some
commentators for the broad proposition that public entities need not compensate
overlying landowners for using groundwater basin storage space. 57 Due to the
unique facts of the case, however, Niles is questionable authority for such a broad
proposition.
58
Niles was a dispute between a commercial sand and gravel company trying to
dewater its gravel pits and a water district importing water to recharge the
groundwater basin to prevent saltwater intrusion and augment local water
supplies.59 The court found that the sand and gravel company, by dewatering its
gravel pits and causing the discharged water (approximately five million gallons
per day) to run off into San Francisco Bay, was engaged in an unreasonable use
60 viltoof water, in violation of California's constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable use. 61 The court held that private lands are subject to a "public
servitude" that allows the underlying aquifer to be recharged by a public water
district.62 This is so long as the recharge does not raise the water table above the
"state of nature" level that would have existed without diversions from the
watershed or extractions from the basin.63
The gravel company argued that the trial court had arranged "to create a new
property interest for the benefit of a public agency, label it a 'servitude,' and
thereby allow that agency to escape liability to the landowner for damages in
inverse condemnation. '' 64 The appellate court rejected this argument based on a
rather breathtaking analytical leap. The court reasoned that, although the
servitude is a burden on the property owner's subsurface land, the doctrinal basis
for the servitude is the right to use the percolating groundwater rather than the
right to use the subsurface land itself.65 By deriving the servitude from
California's correlative rights doctrine, which originated in 1903, the court was
able to conclude that it had not created a new property interest, but that it had
56. 112 Cal. Rptr. 846 (Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
57. See, e.g., Ronald B. Robie & Patricia R. Donovan, Water Management of the Future: A Ground
Water Storage Program for the California State Water Project, 11 PAc. L.J. 41, 53 (1979) (stating Niles held
that public entities need not pay to use groundwater basin storage space).
58. Professor Trelease observed that Niles "is not quite in point" as to this proposition. Frank J. Trelease,
Conjunctive Use of Groundwater and Surface Water, 27 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1853, 1882 (1981).
59. Niles, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
60. Id. at 853.
61. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
62. Niles, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 852-53.
63. Id. at 853-54.
64. Id. at 852.
65. Id.
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merely recognized a burden on the gravel company's water rights which had
existed all along.
66
Because Niles involved a private use of water that was expressly found to be
unreasonable, and thus not subject to constitutional protection, the case may not
resolve the important issue of whether a public entity may spread groundwater in
a manner that precludes an overlying landowner from making a valid use of the
subsurface of his real property without compensation. 67 Given the recent
direction of federal takings jurisprudence,68 it is unclear whether the courts would
sanction public use of an aquifer to the detriment of a landowner's valid private
use without the requirement of compensation.
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando6 9 also addressed the issue of use
of underground storage space, albeit in a context that essentially involved only
competing public entities. The court reaffirmed the ruling in City of Los Angeles
v. City of Glendale70 which had extended the provisions of California Water
Code section 707571 to "the addition and withdrawal of water in an underground
basin.,72 In its analysis of this issue, however, the San Fernando court failed to
draw a clear distinction between the right to use underground storage space and
the right to recapture stored water. Moreover, by relying on Water Code section
7075, the court implicitly recognized that the right of a public entity to store
water in an underground aquifer is subject to certain limitations, including the
requirement that the storage of imported water underground not impair native
groundwater rights.73
Finally, in Central and West Basin Water Replenishment District v. Southern
California Water Company,74 the court characterized subsurface storage space as a
"public resource," rejecting the argument of a water utility that the right to store
water in a basin is "linked" to the right to extract water.
75
Given the unsettled state of the law regarding rights to the use of underground
storage space, it is not surprising that artificial recharge project operators in
California have tended to rely on contractual mechanisms to bridge the gap between
existing law and project needs.76 But where consensual arrangements providing for
66. Id. at 853.
67. See Trager, supra note 54, at 68.
68. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
69. 537 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1975).
70. 142 P.2d 289, 294-95 (Cal. 1943).
71. CAL. WATER CODE § 7075 (West 1992) ("Water which has been appropriated may be turned into the
channel of another stream, mingled with its water, and then reclaimed; but in reclaiming it the water already
appropriated by another shall not be diminished.").
72. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1295.
73. See Gleason, supra note 54, at 640.
74. 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 486, 496 (Ct. App. 2003).
75. Id. at 496.
76. For example, the groundwater storage program conducted by the Semitropic Water District in Kern
County utilizes recorded agreements executed by overlying landowners to confirm the rights of the District to
utilize the underground storage space (copy of agreement on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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the use of underground storage space are not obtainable, conjunctive use program
operators may be at risk of claims for compensation by affected landowners. The
viability of such claims will depend on the future course of development of the law
in this critical area. Clarifying legislation would presumably remove some of the
uncertainty in this area, and promote the goal of expansion of conjunctive use of
groundwater and surface water.
2. Extraction of Stored Water and Rights to Replenish and Manage
The Commission proposed legislation stating that:
[t]he amount of water stored in a groundwater basin shall be subject to
recapture by the person who stored the water or pursuant to an agreement
with the person who stored the water. It shall be presumed that the
person who stores water in a groundwater basin intends to recapture that
water from the basin.77
The legislation further provided that "[l]osses of native water caused by storage
shall be allocated to the stored water to the extent the water causes the loss,
unless otherwise provided in an applicable groundwater storage agreement.
78
The determination of native water losses caused by storage was subject to
judicial review under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.79 Finally,
the legislation provided that "[u]se of a groundwater basin for the purpose of
replenishing and managing local groundwater supplies shall have priority over
the use of a basin for storage of water," and that "[t]he person placing the
replenishment water in the basin shall have the authority to manage the use of
that water." 80 Again, none of these proposals became law.
In California, the rights of public entities engaged in underground storage
operations to recapture water that has been stored underground have typically
been defined through detailed agreements governing the importation, storage,
and extraction of water, often in the form of a stipulated judgment entered in a
groundwater adjudication action. 81 But in unadjudicated basins, the lack of a
legal framework of priorities for allocating storage rights among various agencies
82
raises difficult issues which, in at least one instance, has triggered litigation.
77. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 235.
78. Id.
79. Id.; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5 (West Supp. 2004).
80. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 236.
81. E.g., Chino Basin Mun. Water Dist. v. City of Chino, No. 164327 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernadino
County Jan. 27, 1978).
82. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 10 (discussing the Sacramento Valley Water Management
Agreement); In Re Santa Maria Valley Groundwater Litig., No. 1-97-CV-770214 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara
County) [hereinafter "the Santa Maria Litigation"] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The Santa
Mafia Litigation involves, inter alia, competition between municipal users engaged in the importation of water
via the State Water Project and a local water conservation district which operates a surface storage and
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Professor Trelease foresaw this problem in an early article:
Not all of California's conjunctive use problems have been solved by
Niles and San Fernando. The next phase of the State Water Project
(SWP) will be to maximize its deliveries to the southern counties, and
this will require storage at the lower end of the California Aqueduct to
meet peak demands and provide supplies for use during dry periods or in
case of prolonged disruption of SWP service. Prominently lacking, in the
eyes of the project director, is a legal framework of priorities for
allocating storage rights among the various agencies that may have
concurrent powers to store water within a particular basin. For instance,
the Chino Basin on the eastern fringe of Los Angeles is covered by four
districts that have some powers over parts of the overlying land. An
illustration portraying one possible plan for ultimate solution of the
basin's groundwater problems that would include these rights, some
private rights and some new SWP water shows a veritable pousse-cafe of
seven layers of water stacked one above the other. While the Department
of Water Resources now has the authority to undertake the physical
project, it has recommended clarifying legislation on these priorities and
on procedures and safeguards for implementing the program.
83
Niles and San Fernando "seem[] to imply that overlying water agencies have
a prior right to store enough water underground to assure an adequate annual
water supply for the overlying community." 84 Such a limitation would be
consistent with the correlative rights doctrine on which Niles is purportedly
based. Where a basin contains more storage capacity than is required by
overlying users, and more than one agency desires to utilize such capacity, the
priority rules remain unclear. Legislation addressing the latter issue would be
useful, given the proliferation of conjunctive use projects throughout the State.
D. Groundwater Rights Adjudication
The Commission made a series of recommendations concerning the
86
adjudication of groundwater rights. Although the bulk of the recommendations
involved proposed changes in the rules of civil procedure, aimed at reducing the
groundwater recharge project. For further information regarding the Santa Maria Litigation, see Eric L. Garner
& Jill N. Willis, Right Back Where We Started From: The Last 25 Years of Groundwater Law in California, 36
McGEORGE L. REv. 413 (2005).
83. Trelease, supra note 58, at 1883-1884 (citations omitted).
84. Gleason, supra note 54, at 665.
85. Under the correlative rights doctrine, absent prescription, overlying landowners have priority over
appropriators as to a basin's native yield. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
86. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 237-50.
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length and cost of adjudications,87 the recommendations also included changes in
the substantive law of groundwater rights. Again, the Commission recommendations
met with little success in the Legislature.
The Commission's procedural recommendations attempted to address the
myriad of procedural and logistical issues that confront litigants in groundwater
adjudications. First, the Commission proposed the mandatory disqualification of
a judge when a portion of the groundwater adjudication area lies within the
county of his/her superior court,88 and the mandatory assignment, by the
chairperson of the Judicial Council, of one judge to preside over all proceedings
relating to the action.89 Under the Commission's recommendations, Code of Civil
Procedure sections 170.6,90 relating to disqualification of judges, and 394,91
relating to change of venue in cases involving a county, city, or local agency,
would not apply to groundwater adjudications. 92
Second, the procedural recommendations established strict time requirements
for seeking reference to the SWRCB pursuant to section 2001 of the Water
Code,93 and special procedures for identification of persons or entities known to
own or operate a well within the adjudication area.94 Significantly, the
Commission proposed that so long as the plaintiff included as named parties in
the action all persons or entities known, or who with reasonable diligence can be
determined, to own or operate a well within the jurisdiction, the action would not
be subject to dismissal for failure to join indispensable parties.95 Also included
was a recommended procedure for publication of notice that the adjudication had
been commenced and for the filing of a proof of claim by "all claimants of
present or future rights to use groundwater" within a specified timeframe.96
Finally, the Commission addressed the subject of remedies. The Commission
first proposed a subtle but important modification of the rules of evidence,
providing that, in a proceeding on a motion for preliminary injunction involving
allegations of long-term overdraft, bulletins or other reports of the DWR studies
"indicating that a long-term overdraft exists shall be admissible and shall
constitute prima facie evidence of the overdraft. ' 97 In the author's view, this
rather substantial modification of the rules of evidence in relation to the
admissibility of hearsay, raises significant due process concerns. This is due to
the fact that, typically, the authors of early DWR reports on purportedly over-
87. Id. at 169.
88. id. at 240.
89. Id.
90. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170.6 (West Supp. 2004).
91. Id. §394.
92. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 240.
93. Id. at 241.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 242-45.
97. Id. at 245.
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drafted basins are not available for cross-examination, and the methodologies and
definitions of overdraft utilized by such early investigators may be highly
questionable given current-day legal definitions and hydrologic knowledge.98 The
Commission also proposed special procedures for lis pendens, which provided
that the court shall order a lis pendens giving notice of the initiation of
groundwater adjudication proceedings and including a description of the area of
the adjudication, to be recorded in the office of the county recorder of the county
or counties in which the groundwater basin or management area is situated.99 The
lis pendens would include a statement that "all landowners claiming present or
future rights to extract groundwater, and their successors in interest, [would] be
bound by the adjudication."o° Lastly, the proposal included provisions for court
imposition of a physical solution, 0 1 which appears to codify existing law; 102 for
binding successors to judgments entered in groundwater adjudications;10 3 and, for
continuing jurisdiction.'°4
While the goal of streamlining the groundwater adjudication process is a
worthy one, California trial court judges possess ample authority to adopt special
procedures for groundwater adjudications under existing rules relating to
complex litigation. 10 5 The Commission's "one size fits all" approach to ground-
water adjudications would not significantly improve, and indeed might hinder,
the administration of justice in this area. A better approach would be to establish
recommended general procedures for the conduct of groundwater adjudications.
Because groundwater adjudications differ significantly from case to case with
respect to the nature and complexity of the legal and factual issues, it is important
that trial judges retain flexibility to craft procedural mechanisms that fit the
circumstances of the case.
As noted, the Commission also recommended a series of changes in the
substantive law of groundwater rights, applicable only in the context of
groundwater adjudications. Taken as a whole, these changes, if adopted, would
have resulted in a fairly radical reformulation of the law of groundwater rights in
California.
98. The author is aware of one case in which litigants attempted to establish overdraft through the
introduction of early reports by the DWR and the United States Geological Survey. The trial court ruled such
reports inadmissible hearsay on the issue of overdraft. See supra text accompanying note 80 (discussing the
Santa Maria Litigation).
99. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 246.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 248.
102. See, e.g., Peabody v. Vallejo, 40 P.2d. 486, 498-99 (Cal. 1935); City of Lodi v. E. Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., 60 P.2d 439, 450 (Cal. 1936); Hillside Water Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 76 P.2d 681, 685-86 (Cal.
1938); Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 81 P.2d 533, 563 (Cal. 1938); Allen v. Cal. Water & Tel. Co., 176 P.2d
8, 18-19 (Cal. 1946); City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1316 (Cal. 1975).
103. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 248.
104. Id. at 248-49.
105. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 128, 187 (West 1982 & Supp. 2004); CAL. R. CT. 1800-1830 (2000).
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The Commission first proposed that "[i]n a groundwater adjudication, where
there is a long-term overdraft, rights to the use of the available supply of
groundwater shall be allocated primarily on the basis of recent use."'106 The
Commission proposed a hierarchy of priorities based on the premise that
"[e]xtraction of groundwater based on a pueblo right and extraction to recapture
imported water stored in a groundwater basin directly or indirectly [would] have
priority over all other rights."' 10 7 In the same vein, the Commission proposed that
"[n]o right shall be reserved for any prospective overlying use unless the
prospective overlying user has, prior to the filing of the complaint in the
adjudication, obtained a declaratory judgment that establishes that right."'10 8
The Commission apparently failed to consider the due process issues raised
by its proposal to subordinate rights to "prospective" overlying use. In Wright v.
Goleta Water District,1°9 the trial court determined, in the context of a court
adjudication of groundwater rights, that unexercised overlying rights had lower
priorities than rights actually exercised."0 The trial court relied principally on In
re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System, 1 ' which held that, in the context
of a statutory adjudication of all claimed rights to the use of water in a stream
system conducted pursuant to Water Code section 2500 et seq.,112 the SWRCB
had the power to define and otherwise limit prospective riparian rights." 3 But the
Court of Appeal held that "the application of Long Valley to a private
adjudication would allow prospective rights of overlying landowners to be
subject to the vagaries of an individual plaintiffs pleading without adequate due
process protections."' '14 Thus, absent the establishment of procedures for the
comprehensive adjudication of groundwater rights akin to the procedures for
adjudication of surface water rights established by Water Code section 2500 et
seq.,' 15 it appears that due process requirements would bar adoption of the
Commission's recommendations in this regard.
The Commission also proposed that, in a groundwater rights adjudication
where there is a long-term overdraft, "[a]ll groundwater right holders, except
holders of a pueblo right or a right to recapture imported water stored in a
groundwater basin directly or indirectly, shall share proportionately in any
aggregate reduction in extractions .... 16 This allocation scheme was subject to
the trial court's discretion to "consider factors in addition to recent use to avoid
106. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 237.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 219 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Ct. App. 1985).
110. Id. at 745.
111. 599 P.2d 656 (Cal. 1979); Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
112. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2850 (West 1971 & Supp. 2004).
113. Long Valley, 599 P.2d at 668-69.
114. Wright, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 750.
115. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 2500-2850.
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 238.
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placing inequitable or undue burdens on any party ....,"7 Finally, in determining
rights to groundwater in a basin that is not in overdraft, the Commission noted that:
rights to groundwater shall be allocated first for extraction of groundwater
based on a pueblo right and for extraction to recapture imported water stored
in a groundwater basin directly or indirectly, then for extraction for
overlying uses on a correlative basis, and then for extraction for
appropriative uses on a first in time, first in right basis, subject to any
prescription which may have occurred. 18
The Commission's proposal to adopt "equitable apportionment '""9 as the
touchstone for adjudication of groundwater rights in an overdrafted basin, and its
failure to recognize and discuss the implications of its proposal from a property rights
standpoint is, in hindsight, rather startling. More than two decades following the
issuance of the Commission's Final Report, public water purveyors, relying principally
on a footnote in City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando,120 asserted that
groundwater rights are subject to equitable apportionment in a groundwater
adjudication involving a basin that has been in long-term overdraft. 121 In City of
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 122 a unanimous California Supreme Court held that
the courts may not wholly disregard the priorities of existing water rights in favor of
equitable apportionment in groundwater adjudications. 123
The decision in City of Barstow underscores a consistent theme in the
Commission's work on groundwater-failure to acknowledge the body of
appellate case law that defines the attributes of groundwater rights, in particular
overlying groundwater rights, under California law. In several instances, the
Commission's proposals seek to redefine the attributes of groundwater rights
without acknowledging such redefinition or discussing its constitutional
implications. The Commission's approach in this regard calls to mind Justice
Stewart's often-discussed concurring opinion in Hughes v. State of Washington2 4
in which he observed that:
a state cannot be permitted to defeat the constitutional prohibition against
taking property without due process of law by the simple device of
asserting retroactively that the property it has taken never existed at all.
Whether the decision here worked an unpredictable change in state law
117. Id.at 237.
118. Id. at 239.
119. The Commission's Final Report uses the term "equitable apportionment" in describing the
proposed legislation. Id. at 169. The term, however, is not used in the Commission's legislative proposal.
120. 537 P.2d 1250, 1298 n.61 (Cal. 1975).
121. City of Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853, 867 (Cal. 2000).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 869.
124. 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (Stewart, J. concurring).
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thus inevitably presents a federal question for the determination of this
Court.
12 5
While the Commission's efforts to clarify California groundwater law was
laudable in several respects, its attempts to redefine established rights simply
went too far, and ultimately resulted in failure in the Legislature. Future
commissions would be well-advised to stay within the framework of groundwater
rights as defined by the courts in developing recommendations and legislative
proposals.
III. THE FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA GROUNDWATER LAW
While a comprehensive review of future issues in California groundwater
law is beyond the scope of this article, the following brief discussion examines
three issues that are likely to arise in future years. Unless legislation is enacted
clarifying the applicable rules of law, it would appear that each of these issues
will ultimately be resolved by the courts.
A. In Lieu Storage
Many of the artificial recharge projects developed in California rely in whole
or in part on so-called "in lieu" storage-"the underground storage that results
when a groundwater right owner forgoes the extraction of a certain amount of
groundwater by substituting imported surface water supplies.126 This widespread
reliance on in lieu storage is remarkable in light of the absence of legal authority
recognizing and defining the in lieu storage right. 127 As discussed earlier, the
response in California has been the development of contractual mechanisms to
bridge the gap between legal authority and practical necessity. 128
There are compelling policy arguments on both sides of the in lieu storage
debate. In the typical factual setting, underground storage is accomplished through a
125. Id. at 296-97.
126. Gleason, supra note 54, at 664 (defining exchange, or lieu, storage). For example, the storage operations
conducted by the Semitropic Water Storage District in Kern County, California currently rely exclusively on in lieu
storage. See Sample Contract Between Semitropic Improvement District of Semitropic Water Storage District and for
Intermittent Water Deliveries In Lieu of Groundwater Pumping (1997) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
127. One leading California commentator states: "[Slince neither San Fernando nor Niles involved
claims for in-lieu storage, additional judicial, legislative or contractual authority will apparently be necessary to
provide the protection necessary for storing water underground by surface water exchange provisions."
Gleason, supra note 54, at 665. No subsequent California case or statute clarifies the law in this regard,
although the issue has been the subject of litigation in California. See San Benito County Water Dist. v. Del
Piero, No. 18123 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Benito County filed Aug. 19, 1994). The unpublished opinion of the
Court of Appeal in the San Benito Litigation did not reach the in lieu storage issue because the court concluded
that there was no surplus water in the subject basin even when considering the imported water. Id. at 23 n.9. The
Court, after recognizing the "keen interest" in the in lieu storage issue of certain amici, stated: "We are not
inclined to decide these important and difficult issues until a case requires us to do so." Id.
128. See supra Part II.C.1.
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reduction in pumping made possible by the delivery of imported surface water;
recapture is accomplished by pumping from private wells, for which the importing
district charges a water toll. The difference between the price of imported surface
water and the pumped water charge is a tool for managing groundwater levels. The
importing district can achieve the same result of groundwater management and
replenishment by this in lieu storage, it is argued, without the expense and
environmental disruption caused by the construction of percolating ponds, injection
wells, recovery wells, or more extensive distribution systems. It is further argued that
neither legal nor policy considerations justify penalizing the importing district for
using a more efficient means of achieving the same goal (artificial recharge) that was
recognized and protected in cases such as San Fernando and Niles. Finally,
proponents of the in lieu concept argue that the "entity bearing the cost of substituted
surface water supply should logically have a claim to the resulting groundwater
augmentation, and should be permitted to preserve, lease or sell its rights to the
exchange waters."
' 129
On the other side of the coin, the question arises: if in lieu storage is such a good
idea, why have the legislatures of most western states declined to endorse the
principle? The answer may lie in considerations of maximum utilization of water
resources.
Under California's correlative rights doctrine, one of two sets of allocation rules
will apply, depending on the condition of the basin from which groundwater is to be
extracted. If the basin water supply exceeds the reasonable needs of overlying
landowners, the basin is deemed to be in "surplus" condition and non-overlying users
are entitled to appropriate the surplus for use on non-overlying lands.' 30 If the basin
supply is insufficient to meet the reasonable needs of all overlying users, then the
overlying users are entitled to share the available supply in correlation to their
respective needs.1 3 1 Absent proof of prescription, appropriators have no right to
utilize water from a basin where no surplus exists.
The policy debate over in lieu storage is brought into clear focus in the
following factual scenario: A basin is in overdraft 132 condition for a period of
many years. Importation of supplemental surface water to the basin commences
and water users begin substituting surface water for groundwater. The basin
returns to surplus condition as a result of the importation of supplemental water.
A non-overlying user (or an overlying user with a previously inadequate water
129. Gleason, supra note 54, at 665.
130. Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766, 772 (Cal. 1903).
131. Id.
132. Under California law, "overdraft" occurs when extractions exceed safe yield plus any "temporary
surplus." "Safe yield" is:
the maximum quantity of water which can be withdrawn annually from a ground water
supply under a given set of conditions without causing an undesirable result. The phrase
'undesirable result' is understood to refer to a gradual lowering of the ground water levels
resulting eventually in depletion of the supply. ,
City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1308 (Cal. 1975) (citation omitted).
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supply) who does not share in the cost of importing the supplemental water
proposes to utilize the newly-created basin surplus. The importing district has no
current need for the surplus basin water because there is sufficient imported
water to meet its water supply requirements and the district is bound by "take or
pay" contract requirements to purchase the supplemental water. If groundwater
levels continue to rise, there will eventually be a discharge of surplus water from
the basin to the ocean or other non-usable source. It is not necessary to maintain
such discharge to prevent seawater intrusion or other undesirable conditions.
In this scenario, the importing district would argue that the non-overlying
user should not receive an economic free ride and should not benefit from the
district's efforts and investment. It would further argue that conjunctive use of
groundwater and surface water is urgently needed to maximize available water
supplies and that no responsible agency would consider risking the major public
expenditures necessary for water importation if the resulting groundwater storage
would be subject to recapture by others. The non-overlying user would counter
that the state's constitutional or statutory requirement of maximum utilization of
water resources 133 will be severely undermined if the district is allowed to "lock
up" the basin surplus without any demonstration of immediate need or injury if
the appropriation of surplus were to occur.
There are no simple answers to this policy conundrum. While there may be
instances in which the protection of public investment in imported water supplies
is of paramount concern, the constitutional prohibition against waste and
unreasonable use 134 would seem to control, at least in situations where the failure
to capture basin surplus will result in waste through discharge to a non-usable
source, and such discharge is not necessary to prevent other undesirable
consequences. The more difficult question involves the rights of the non-
overlying user to capture and use that increment of basin surplus that would exist
prior to discharge and waste. Although the constitutional requirement of
maximum utilization remains implicated, the practical effect of that requirement
is difficult to predict absent a comprehensive assessment of the hydrologic,
economic and legal aspects of a particular case.
B. Nature of the Recapture Right
The San Fernando decision defines the right to recapture artificial recharge
as "an undivided right to a quantity of water in the ground reservoir equal to the
net amount by which the reservoir is augmented by [imported water]. ' '13S The
"measure of the recapture right is thus the net amount of additional groundwater
attributed to the imported supply, so that the storer bears the risk of lOSS.
' 136
133. In California, this requirement is embodied in CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
134. Id.
135. City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1296 (Cal. 1975).
136. Gleason, supra note 54, at 645.
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Current litigation, pending in California, places at issue the meaning and effect of
these basic rules.1
37
An important and unresolved issue is the extent to which native water rights
may be impaired when stored imported waters are recaptured from the
underground. San Fernando appears to subordinate the rights of private
landowners to the rights of public agencies to recapture imported water stored
underground. 38 But the effect of this subordination is not yet known. For
example, where an importing agency recaptures stored water through massive
pumping from a well field that severely impacts neighboring pumpers through,
for example, water level drawdown and inducement of migration of salts, is the
injury non-compensable due to the paramount nature of the recapture right?
Similarly, does an importing agency's paramount recapture right give it the
authority to maintain water levels at a high level for the convenience of its
recapture program, even though such high levels result in damage to neighboring
landowners through liquefaction or other processes? 139 These issues remain
unresolved.
C. Scope of County Authority to Regulate Groundwater
In Baldwin v. County of Tehama,140 the Third Appellate District held that a
county ordinance that required a permit to extract groundwater for the purpose of
use on land other than where the extraction occurs was not preempted by state
law. 14  In the wake of Baldwin, numerous California counties have adopted
ordinances aimed at regulating the extraction and use of groundwater.
142
The facts of Baldwin were rather unique, however, and important questions
remain as to the scope of the decision. In Baldwin, the plaintiffs owned land in
Tehama County and wanted to extract groundwater for use in irrigating land in
two neighboring counties. 143 Thus, the decision in Baldwin does not address, at
least directly, the issue of whether county regulation of a groundwater
137. See supra text accompanying note 80 (discussing the Santa Maria Litigation). One of the central issues
in the Santa Maria Litigation is whether, in the context of a groundwater basin that is spilling continuously to the
ocean, imported water stored underground is deemed the first to spill.
138. San Fernando, 537 P.2d at 1314.
139. An interesting dispute has arisen in California between Water Replenishment Districts, which operate
an artificial recharge project in an adjudicated basin in Los Angeles County, and the California Department of
Transportation (Caltrans), which constructed the 1-105 freeway near Los Angeles International Airport. In 1995,
shortly after the opening of the freeway, Caltrans suffered damage to the freeway as a result of the intrusion of
groundwater from the basins in which recharge activities are ongoing. Caltrans has incurred costs amounting to
over $60 million for repairs to the freeway, including replacement of a sub-surface drainage system, and installation
and operation of de-watering wells. Virginia Ellis, Century Freeway: Caltrans' 'Dirty Little Secret'; Built Too
Close to the Water Table, Part of the 1-105 is Threatened With Collapse. Agency's Multimillion-Dollar Repair
Efforts Have Been Hidden From Legislature, Public, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1999, at Al.
140. 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Ct. App. 1994).
141. Id.at888.
142. DWR BuLLErIN 118, supra note 3, at 36.
143. Baldwin, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
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substitution water transfer-in which groundwater is pumped in substitution for
surface water and the surface water is conveyed for sale to a transferee-is
subject to county regulation or whether such transfers are preempted by statutes
granting authority over surface water transfers to the SWRCB. Because
groundwater substitution transfers are likely to be an important element of water
resource management in California in the future, resolution of this issue is critical
to the further development of active water markets within the State.
A comprehensive analysis of the issue of preemption in the context of
groundwater substitution transfers is beyond the scope of this Article. In the
author's view, substantial and difficult preemption questions are raised when a
county purports to regulate a water transfer that is subject to regulation by the
SWRCB. Moreover, aside from the issue of preemption, there are important
policy issues raised by county regulation in this area. In the author's experience,
most California counties are ill-equipped, both from the standpoint of funding
and expertise, to engage in the regulation of groundwater substitution transfers.
From a policy standpoint, it would be preferable to have local public entities that
are engaged in groundwater regulation under Assembly Bill 3030 or other
statutes take the lead role in the review of technical elements of groundwater
substitution transfers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Commission's efforts in the field of groundwater achieved few concrete
results principally due to its failure to work within the established water rights
framework. Future efforts to promote the effective management of California's
critical groundwater resources must acknowledge, and work within, this
established legal framework. The considerable achievements of many local
public entities in the field of groundwater management can provide an important
platform for future success in this arena.

